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L INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from the beginning, tried to deal with
the belief that the old issue pleading system, where discovery did not exist,
was inefficient in the delivery of justice.' It was believed, therefore, that
liberal permissive discovery "would inform the parties of the relevant facts,
eliminate surprise, help limit the issues, and provide a basis for either intelligent
settlement or an efficient trial." 2 Rule 26, as amended in 1993, intended to
cure, the burden placed on the parties to seek the right information through
discovery.3 However, an important proviso in the initial required disclosures
J.D. Candidate, May 2001, University of Miami School of Law; BA Indiana University,
December 1990. The author wishes to thank her family for their patience and support.
I See Paul W. Green, Reassessment of the Lauwers' Discovery Responsibilities: The Eady Disclosure
Prot isions of the Proposed Amendments to Rule 26, Federal Ruls of Civil Procedure, ALA. LAW.,July 1992, at 278.
2 See id. at 279 (emphasis added). Magistrate Green argued that discovery abuses by adversarial
attorneys caused much of the delay and expense of trial perceived by lawyers,judges and the public. He
claimed that "the non-adversarial approach to discovery is intended to simplify and expedite the resolution
of litigation" in support of the initial disclosure requirement of rule 26. See id. at 278.
3 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes (1993) (amended 2000) ("This subdivision
imposes on parties a duty to disclose, without awaiting formal discovery requests, certain basic
information....").
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was an "opt out" clause allowing the federal district courts to not mandate
these disclosures.4  This led many federal district courts, including the
southern district of Florida, to take this opt out provision by local rule.' On
the other hand, many federal district courts, including the northern district
of Florida, have adopted this initial disclosure requirement.6 This disparity,
therefore, is evident within the state of Florida. The southern district of
Florida without any discussion as to its reasons for choosing the opt-out
provision, simply stated, "[t]he disclosure requirements imposed by Rule
26(a)(1)-(4). .. , shall not apply to civil proceedings in this court ... "' The
northern district of Florida, in contrast, explicitly adopted the initial
disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(1), stating that, "[i]t is the court's
intention to implement these early disclosures, which appear to be cost
effective and which should reduce much of the delay in the discovery
process ....
The inconsistency with which the federal district courts adopted the
initial disclosure requirements led to a proposed amendment to Rule 26
which took effect December 1, 2000.9 The amended Rule 26 (hereinafter the
"2000 amendment") therefore makes it mandatory to comply with these
initial disclosure requirements, thereby eliminating the "opt out" provision
by local rule.' ° The advisory committee acknowledged widespread support
for a national uniform disclosure rule." However, there continues to be
resistance to the new procedure in some districts, where some early studies
4 See FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(a)(1) (1993) (amended 2000) ("Except to the extent otherwise stipulated
or directed by order or local rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other
parties: .
s See, e.g., AL R USDCTMD, Optional FRCP Amendments; AR R USDCTED, Order 42 re
FRCP Amendments; CA R USDCTSD CIVLR 26.1; CT R USDCT L.Civ.R. 37; FL R USDCTSD, Gen.
R. 26.1; IAR USDCT LR 26.1.
6 See, e.g., IL R USDCTSD 26.1; DC R USDCT LCvR 26.2; AKR RCP 26; C.R.C.P. 26; FL R
USDCTND, Expense and Delay Reduction.
7 See FL R USDCTSD, Gen. R. 26.1 (emphasis added).
8 See FL R USDCTND, Expense and Delay Reduction.
9 See FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(a)(1) (amended 2000). The advisory committee notes make it clear that
"[t]he Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosure provisions are amended to establish a nationally uniform practice."
Id.
1o The 2000 Amendment states: "Except in categories of proceedings specified in Rule
26(a)(1)(E), or to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party must, without awaiting a
discovery request, provide to other parties: .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (amended 2000).
11 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (amended 2000) ("Many lawyers have experienced difficulty
in coping with divergent disclosure and other practices as they move from one district to another.");
Thomas E. Willging et al.,An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule
Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 541 (1998) ("Since [1993 revisions to Rule 26], an increasing number
ofvoices among both bench and bar have asserted that nonuniformity in the discovery rules - and in the
disclosure rules in particular - is a serious problem and should be resolved.").
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suggested little savings in cost and time.'2 This resistance has been met with
a try it, you'll like it, approach. Specifically, commentators suggest that
although many attorneys "are opposed to mandatory disclosure in theory,
they tend to be significantly more satisfied when they actually participate in
early disclosure on their case.
"13
Additionally, Federal Rule 37(c) adds force to Rule 26(a) and (e)
disclosure requirements by permitting a district court judge to exclude
testimony by an undisclosed witness. 4 Even though the requirements for
disclosure of different types of witnesses, ie. expert versus fact witnesses are
different under Rule 26(a),"s the punishment for failure to comply is
uniformly applied under Rule 37(c).
It is well known that Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are "patterned after"
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and one continuing problem that both
courts have been dealing with is the question of what and when is a witness
a surprise witness. However, Florida has not adopted the initial disclosure
requirement of Rule 26(a)(1). Instead, Florida relies on a combination of
Rule 1.200, which establishes pretrial procedures, and the trial court judge's
discretion to determine whether a witness is a surprise witness and should
be excluded from testifying.1
6
This comment first examines Florida case law establishing the test for
exclusion of witness testimony when an opposing party was "surprised", as
well as the various interpretations of that test as applied by the trial courts
and district courts of appeals. Next, this comment will examine Federal case
law, establishing the test for exclusion of witness testimony prior to the 1993
amendment of Rule 26(a)(1). Third, this comment then examines the
application of this test to violations of Rule 26(a) and its enforcement
12 See David A. Churchill & Sada Manickam, The Continuing Evolution ofthe Mandatory Disclosure
Requirements of Federal Rule 26, PROCUREMENT LAW., Winter 2000, at 3.
0 See id. (quotingjamcs S. KakalikJust, Speedy, and InnTpensive?Judicial Case Management Under
the Civil Justice Reform Act, JUDICATURE, Jan.-Feb. 1997); see also Willging et al., supra note 11, at 562
(finding that 80% of participants in national survey of two thousand civil attorneys responded that the
initial disclosures in Rule 26 "decreased their client's overall litigation expenses, the time from filing to
disposition, the amount of discovery, and the number of discovery disputes.").
14 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c). The rule states "[a] party that without substantial justification fails
to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1) shall not, unless such failure is harmless, be
permitted to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness ... not so disclosed." Id.
Is See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (calling for disclosure ofindividuals that may have discoverable
and relevant information); FED. R CIv. P. 26(a)(2)(A), (calling for the disclosure of any person who at
trial may present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
t6 See Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (Fla. 1981) ("Existing Rule 1.200 of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides an adequate framework, when supplemented by a faithful
adherence to the notions of discovery which underpin civil trial practice and the good judgment of
Florida's trial judges.").
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provision in Rule 37(c). Finally, this comment concludes with a discussion
examining the possibility of Florida adopting the initial disclosure
requirements of Rule 26(a)(1).
II. FLORIDA CASE LAW
A. Binger v. King Pest Control
In 1981, the Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide which of
four approaches taken by the Florida appellate courts should be used to
resolve the problem of pretrial witness disclosure.'7 In King Pest Control v.
Binger,' the trial court judge allowed the Bingers to present at trial the
testimony of an impeachment witness who was not listed on their pretrial
catalogue, in accordance with the pretrial order.' 9 King Pest Control objected
to the introduction of the testimony because the pretrial order in that case
required the parties to exchange witness lists at least twenty days before the
trial began.2' Additionally, the order required the listing of all witnesses on
the pretrial catalog.2' The Fourth District Court of Appeals determined the
requirement that all witnesses be listed included impeachment witnesses,
reversing the trial court, and the Supreme Court of Florida granted certiorari.
In its opinion, the Florida Supreme Court surveyed the approaches taken
by the district courts in resolving the problem of pretrial witness disclosure.
First, some cases suggested that impeachment witnesses did not need to be
disclosed.'2 Second, "[a]t least one case appears to conclude that, . . . , a
'rebuttal' witness need not be disclosed prior to trial." 3 Third, a witness who
is responding to any new or surprise testimony brought out at trial need not
be listed.24 The Florida Supreme Court specifically rejected these first three
17 See id.
is See King Pest Control v. Binger, 379 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), rev'd, 401 So. 2d 1310
(Fla. 1981).
19 See Binger, 401 So. 2d at 1311. The impeachment witness in that case was an expert witness
who was retained in order to impeach King Pest Control's expert witness. The issue in that case revolved
around disclosure of impeachment witnesses and not disclosure of expert witnesses. See id. Therefore,
this comment does not intend to reconcile the pre-trial disclosure of expert witnesses in Florida with Rule
26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but rather to focus on the test of exclusion once a rule has
been violated.
2D See Binger, 401 So. 2d at 1311.
21 See id.
2 See id. at 1312. This was the approach relied upon by the Bingers, arguing that impeachment
witnesses did not need to be disclosed prior to trial. See id. at 1311-12.
23 Id. at 1312.
2 See id.
FEDERAL RULE 26
approaches, opting instead to adopt the fourth approach suggested by the
district court in that case. "That approach places all problems regarding the
testimony of undisclosed witnesses within the broad discretion of the trial
judge."
26
The Florida Supreme Court went on to caution that the trial judge's
discretion should not be exercised blindly, but should be guided by four
factors.27 First, the trial judge should look to see if the "undisclosed witness
will prejudice the objecting party."28 In this sense, prejudice, said the court,
is defined by surprise in fact.2 9 Second, the trial judge should look at the
"objecting party's ability to cure the prejudice or, similarly, his independent
knowledge of the existence of the witness."3° Third, the "calling party's
possible intentional, or bad faith, noncompliance with the pretrial order."3
Lastly, the trial judge should consider "the orderly and efficient trial of the
case...."3 2 The court concluded when applying these factors to the instant
case, the Bingers should have listed their impeachment witness on the
pretrial catalog and since they failed to do so, his testimony should have been
excluded.33
B. Courts of Appeals Cases
The Binger test has subsequently evolved into a two-part inquiry. The
first question that needs to be decided is whether the witness has been
sufficiently disclosed for the purposes of the pretrial order. 4 If the first
question is answered in the negative, then the trial court must ask whether
"use of the undisclosed witness will prejudice the objecting party."35
2s See id. at 1313. The court stated, "[w]e expressly disapprove decisions in the first three
categories ofwitness disclosure cases which hold or imply that certain types ofwitnesses are automatically
exempt from the dictates of a pretrial disclosure." Id.
Z6 See id. at 1313.






33 See id. The court concluded that since the Bingers knew the expert's name and the substance
of his testimony prior to trial, the Bingers should have known that they would call their own expert
witness and the only reason for not disclosing his name was to impeach King Pest Control's expert by
using surprise tactics. See id.
34 See HealthSouth Sports Med. and Rehab. Ctr. of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Roark, 723 So. 2d 314,
317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
3s See Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (Fla. 1981).
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1. WAS THE WITNESS DISCLOSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PRETRIAL ORDER?
In Casa deAlabanza v. Bus Service,36 the Third District Court of Appeals
answered the first question in the affirmative. In that case, the plaintiff failed
to list a witness' identity on its pretrial catalogue. Instead, the plaintiff
"indicate[d] in its witness list that it would be calling '[a] ny and all parties to
this lawsuit'."37 The defendant objected to the calling of this witness and the
trial court sustained the objection. On appeal, the appellate court reasoned
that since the plaintiff was a church it should therefore be treated as a
corporation. 38 The court added that since the excluded witness was a
representative of the church, the representative therefore fell within the
definition of "party" listed on plaintiffs witness list.39 Consequently, since
the appellate court answered the first question in the affirmative, that the
witness was sufficiently disclosed, the court did not need to reach the second
question.
However, in HealthSouth Sports Medicine and Rehabilitation Center of Boca
Raton, Inc. P. Roark,"' the Fourth District Court of Appeals disagreed with
Casa de Alabanza, stating that the listing of a generic term does not
sufficiently identify the person for the purposes of the pretrial catalog."' In
that case, the pretrial order required the parties to exchange the "names and
addresses of all fact witnesses."42 The defendants' witness list included "[a]ll
parties to this action and/or their authorized representatives."4 3 The
defendants attempted to call their witness, an administrator of the
defendant's corporation, in rebuttal, and the plaintiff objected." The trial
court sustained the objection, only allowing the witness to testify to
conversations she had had with the plaintiff's witness about which the
plaintiff's witness had already testified, and prohibited her from testifying to
several factual matters.45 The defendants argued that Casa de Alabanza was
controlling, and therefore their unnamed representative should have been
able to testify as a representative of a corporation.46 The court of appeals
36 669 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
37 Id. at 339.
38 Seeid.
39 Se id.
40 723 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
41 See id. at 317.






rejected both the defendant's argument and the Third District Court of
Appeals' view, 7 certifying the question of whether a listing of a generic term
on the pretrial catalog is sufficient disclosure when one party is a
corporation.4
Since the district court in that case answered the first question in the
negative, that the witness was not sufficiently disclosed, the court then found
it necessary to consider whether allowing the witness to testify would
prejudice the objecting party. After quoting the Binger test, the court stated
that the record was insufficient to show whether the defendant was
prejudiced by not allowing the witness to testify to the excluded facts,49
whether the plaintiff could have cured the prejudice, whether there was bad
faith noncompliance, or if the trial would have been disruptedis0 In short,
the court described the primary difficulty with applying the Binger test, in
most cases, the trial court record is not going to show consideration of these
factors. It is left up to the reviewing courts to see if there is any evidence in
the record that could support the trial court judge's ruling. If no such
evidence can be found one way or the other, the reviewing court is unlikely
to question the trial judge's ruling.5'
Although the two prior cases dealt with non-disclosure of fact witnesses,
Florida courts make no distinction between non-disclosure of fact witnesses
and expert witnesses when determining whether surprise witness testimony
should be excluded.
2. WAs THERE PREJUDICE TO THE OBJECTING PARTY?
A survey of Florida's appellate cases dealing with surprise expert witness
testimony reveals, in general, there is no surprise in fact, and therefore no
prejudice, when the testimony of the witness is known, regardless of whether
he/she is listed on the pretrial witness list.
In Office Depot, Inc. v. Miller,52 the Fourth District Court of Appeals
concluded there was surprise in fact where the witness was listed on the
47 See id. at 317 ('We conclude that listing an 'authorized representative' does not comply with
a pretrial order requiring the exchange ofnames and addresses of fact witnesses .... We thus disagree with
Casa deAlabanza.").
48 See id. (certifiying the conflict with Casa deAlabanza).
49 See id. The Defendants had profered the administrator's testimony to rebut the Plaintiff's
witness' testimony that medical records had been forged. See id. at 316.
so See id. at 317-18.
s1 See id. at 318 ("The trial court's discretion in determining whether an uncalled witness can
testify is broad.").
52 584 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
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pretrial catalog, but reversed his opinion prior to testifying.13 In that case,
plaintiff alleged she sustained an injury while shopping in the defendant's
store. At the defendant's request, plaintiff was examined by a neurologist
who rendered an opinion favorable to the plaintiff. Prior to trial, the
defendant requested that the neurologist again review his notes and notes
supplied by other physicians. While reviewing these notes, including notes
from other treating physicians that he claims not to have looked at
previously, the neurologist changed his opinion.' The plaintiffs counsel
objected to the neurologist testifying, but the court allowed the testimony.5
On motion, the trial court entered an order granting the plaintiff a new trial
premised in part on "the direct recanting of deposition testimony by
defendant's expert witness, ... which totally surprised plaintiff and resulted
in a trial by ambush on the part of defendant."s6
In Garcia v. Emerson Electric Co.,S7 the district court determined that the
trial court abused its discretion when it "reversed its pretrial ruling after
plaintiffs had substantially completed their case in chief to permit
[defendant] to introduce additional expert evidence which could not be
reviewed by plaintiffs' expert until the day of the trial."5" In that case, while
the trial court had initially ruled that taped experiments done by defendant's
expert prior to his pretrial deposition would be admissible, those that were
not completed would be excluded." During trial however, the defendants
notified the court that they could not edit the tapes to erase the excluded
testimony.' ° Over the plaintiffs objections, the trial court allowed in all the
tapes, concluding that plaintiffs could eliminate the prejudice to themselves
during rebuttal.6 The district court determined this was an abuse of
discretion, because during rebuttal was the first opportunity that plaintiffs
expert had to hear the opinion of defendant's expert.2 Therefore, the
53 See id. at 590. The court stated "[a] party can hardly prepare for an opinion that it doesn't
know about, much less one that is a complete reversal of the opinion it has been provided." Id.; see also
Keller Indus. v. Volk, 657 So. 2d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (concluding the exclusion ofan expert's
mid-trial revelation ofhow an accident occurred was proper, but exclusion ofall expert witness' testimony
went too far).
54 See id. at 588.
ss See id. The court indicated that it would entertain appropriate motions at a later time. See id.
56 Id.
s7 677 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
58 See id. at 20.
59 See id. at 21. The expert in that case testified by video tape, and the experiments were part of
this taped testimony. See id.
60 See id.
61 See id.
61 See id. Plaintiffs' expert was also excluded from hearing direct testimony during trial. See id.
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introduction of new evidence, even though the expert was listed on the
pretrial catalog, was grounds for reversal.'
On the other hand, in Lugo v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.,4 the Third
District Court ofAppeals did not find surprise or prejudice even though the
witness was not listed on the pre-trial catalog, where the witness' testimony
was known prior to trial. In that case, the plaintiffwas injured while at work
and filed suit to recover damages. The pretrial order required the parties to
trade names and addresses of all expert witnesses they intended to call. The
plaintiffs failed to file a list with the name of their expert witness. Prior to
trial, however, defendant's moved for summaryjudgment, and in opposition,
plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of their expert witness.6s The motion for
summary judgment was denied and defendants took the plaintiff's expert's
deposition several days prior to trial. On the fourth day of trial, the
defendants moved to have the plaintiffs' expert witness excluded from
testifying because he was not listed on the pretrial catalog.' The trial court
granted defendant's motion stating that "the pretrial order 'must be strictly
complied with.'" 67 The Third District Court of Appeals reversed. After
quoting the four-factor test from Binger, the Court determined that the trial
court had abused its discretion stating:
It is... evident from the record that (1) the defendants were not
surprised in fact, (2) there was adequate time to cure the prejudice,
if there was any, and (3) allowing the witness to testify would not
have disrupted the orderly and efficient trial of the case.6'
Another case where the Third District Court of Appeals found it
necessary to reverse and remand a case was Melrose Nursery, Inc. v. Hunt.69 In
that case, the district court found that it was error to exclude a court-
appointed expert witness, even though not listed on the defendant's pre-trial
catalogue, because the plaintiffs' had "possession of the expert's report for
several months prior to the trial and would, therefore, not have been
prejudiced by his testimony."70
63 See id.; see also Sayad v. Ailey, 508 So. 2d 485,486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) ("The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in restricting the testimony of the Defendant's expert... to subject matter which had
been timely revealed in discovery and in precluding his opinion as to an area which had not.*).
rA 487 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
6s See id. at 323.
66 See id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 324.
69 443 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
70 See id. at 441-42.
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The apparent trend of the Florida district courts therefore, is that there
is no surprise if it is an expert witness, and the witness' testimony is known,
even if it is only contained in a report.7 '
Contrary to the above cases, in Davis v. Pfund, 2 the Third District Court
of Appeals determined that the trial court had abused its discretion when it
excluded expert testimony where the expert had made clarification to his
original drawings after the close of discovery.73 In that case, the expert
returned to the scene ofan accident in the period after the pretrial conference
and the close ofdiscovery to take measurements to clarify his drawings. The
trial court had concluded that this was a violation of its order that closed
discovery and excluded the expert's testimony.7 4 The district court reversed,
stating that there was no authority that stated that an expert could not
continue to prepare materials he will testify about.7' A fine distinction can
be made of Pfund, however, between a substantial reversal of opinion and a
clarification of a known opinion. However, it seems that any clarification of
an opinion will lead to some surprise testimony. Additionally, there would
be no chance for the surprised party to cure the prejudice because the expert
had "clarified" his drawings after the close of discovery. Therefore, since the
report containing the original opinion was discoverable and the clarified
opinion was not, there is surprise to the opposing party.76
As these cases illustrate, there is significant difficulty in determining not
only when to apply the Binger four-factor test, but in the application of the
test itself.
IM. FEDERAL LAW PRIOR TO 1993
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 16(e)
The Federal Rules of Civd Procedure prior to the 1993 amendment primarily
relied on Rule 16 to guide case management. Rule 16 is the equivalent of
Rule 1.200 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 16(e) allows the
71 See William VanDercre Civil Procedur: 1992 Survey ofFlorida Law, NOVA L. REv., Fall 1992,
at 96 ("Inadequate notice [of an expert's opinion] can result in a new trial ....
7 479 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
73 See id. at 231.
74 See id.
75 Se id.
76 Once discovery is closed, there is no opportunity for the parties to take depositions or request
documents to support their cases.
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federal district court to enter an order, which controls the subsequent events
of an action.'
B. Federal Case Law Standard for Exclusion of a Witness for Violations of
Rule 16(e)
Generally, the Federal district courts and circuit courts have adopted the
same formulation for exclusion ofa witness not listed in compliance with the
pre-trial order as the Florida courts.
In Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co.,78 the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals listed the four factors that a district court should consider "[i]n
ruling on a party's motion to call a witness not included on a pretrial witness
list ordered pursuant to rule 16 of the Federal Rules, of Civil
Procedure ... "79 The court stated:
(1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the
excluded witnesses would have testified;
(2) the ability of that party to cure the prejudice;
(3) the extent to which waiver of the rule against calling unlisted
witnesses would disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case
or of other cases in the court;
(4) bad faith or willfulness in failing to comply with the court's
order.s°
In that case, the district court had no trouble determining whether or not
the prospective witness had been disclosed. He was not.8 ' Additionally, the
district court, after considering the factors above, concluded that "permitting
7 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(e). Rule 16 provides:
(e) Pretrial Orders. After any conference held pursuant to this rule, an order shall be entered
reciting the action taken. This order shall control the subsequent course of the action unless
modified by a subsequent order. The order following a final pretrial conference shall be
modified only to prevent manifest injustice.
Id.
" 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982).
79 Id. at 1245.
W' Id. (citing De Marines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193, 1202 (3d Cir. 1978)).
This is particularly relevant to the issue in this comment as the Florida Supreme Court relied on the same
test. See Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310, 1314 n. 10 (Fla. 1981) (citing DeMarines v. KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193 (3d. Cir. 1978)).
See Spray-Rite, 684 F.2d at 1245 ("McGuire was not listed on the final pretrial witness
list .. )
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[the defendant] Monsanto to call McGuire would prejudice Spray-Rite
because Spray-Rite did not have adequate time to prepare for the witness.
"12
In Price v. Seydel 3 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
Spray-Rite formulation.' The court determined that the magistrate judge
abused his discretion when he refused to allow the plaintiff to call a
defendant party where the defendant's name was not listed on the plaintiff s
witness list.85  In that case, plaintiff sued defendant for fraudulent
inducement in the purchase of a motel. At trial, the plaintiffcalled one of the
defendants to the witness stand, and the defendants objected. 6 The trial
court sustained the objection. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating
"the magistrate judge abused his discretion by refusing to allow Price
[plaintiff] to call Thomas Seydel [defendant] as a witness." 87 Applying the
Seventh Circuit's formulation, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
defendant could not have been surprised because the defendant was listed as
a witness on his own witness list. "He expected to be rigorously cross-
examined by Price's attorney when he took the stand." 8 Additionally, the
court noted that there was no evidence of bad faith and that the defendant's
testimony was crucial to the plaintiff's claims of misrepresentation. s9
IV. FEDERAL LAW AFrER 1993
A. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
One of the most significant changes made in the 1993 amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was the adoption of Rule 26(a)(1). This
rule "impose[d] on parties a duty to disclose, without awaiting formal
discovery requests, certain basic information that is needed in most cases to
prepare for trial or make an informed decision about settlement."9° One of
the things that is required in the initial disclosure provision is "the name and,
if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have
discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity
82 Id. The court noted that the Defendant had only given the Plaintiff three days notice that it
intended to call the witness. See id.
3 961 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1992).
84 See id. at 1474.
as See id.
86 See id. at 1472.
W7 See id. at 1474.
Id.
89 See id.
90 FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee notes (1993) (amended 2000).
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in the pleadings, identifyingthe subjects of the information." 9' Additionally,
the parties have a duty to supplement disclosures under Rule 26(e) when
"the party learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is
incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has
not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery
process or in writing."92
The combined effect of these rules was to shift the burden from the party
trying to obtain information through traditional discovery devices to the
other party to disclose it voluntarily. However, Rule 26(a) included an "opt
out" provision allowing Federal district courts to promulgate local rules that
did not require litigants to comply with Rule 26(a) (1).93 Effective December
1, 2000, however, Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures became mandatory for all
Federal district courts.94
Rule 37(c)(1) is the enforcement provision, requiring the parties to
comply with the initial disclosure requirement. 9s That rule states U [a] party
without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule
26(a) or 26(e)(1) shall not, unless such failure is harmless, be permitted to use as
evidence at trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not
so disclosed." % Rule 37(c) therefore provides two ways of getting out of
punishment for failing to disclose under Rule 26(a), substantial justification
for failing to do so or the failure was harmless.c' As we will see, significant
amounts of case law have been addressed to answering when each clause has
91 FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (1993) (amended 2000).
92 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1) (1993) (amended 2000).
93 See supra notes 3-13, and accompanying text.
9 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (amended 2000). The committee notes make clear that amended
subdivision (a)(1):
Remove[s] the authority to alter or opt out of the national disclosure requirements by local
rule, invalidating not only formal local rules but also informal 'standing' orders of an
individual judge or court that purport to create exemptions from - or limit or expand - the
disclosure provided under the national rule.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes (amended 2000).
95 See FED. I Civ. P. 37(c) advisory committee notes. The notes make it clear that the 1993
revision "provides a self-executing sanction for failure to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a),
without need for a motion under subdivision (a)(2)(A)." Id.
% FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(emphasis added). The proposed 2000 amendment does not
substantially change this rule, adding only that the parties have a continuing duty to supplement discovery
in Rule 26(e)(2) as well. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee notes (amended 2000).
97 See Vance v. United States, No. 98-5488, 1999 WL 455435, at *3 (6th Cir. June 25, 1999) ("It
is well-established that Fed. it Civ. P. 37(c)(1), enacted in 1993, mandates that a trial court punish a party
for discovery violations in connection with Rule 26 unless the violation was harmless or is substantially
justified.").
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been satisfied, however, this comment focuses on the second clause and the
adoption of the four-part test.98
B. Federal Cases Interpreting Rule 37(c)
In 1995, the Seventh Circuit decided Bronk v. Ineichen,99 which is
generally cited for bridging the gap between Rule 16, Rule 26(a) and Rule
37(c).'0° In Bronk, deaf tenants brought an action against their landlord for
alleged discrimination under the Fair Housing Amendments Act.'°' The
landlord put on expert witness testimony showing that the plaintiff s rights
had not been violated, and plaintiffs attempted to call a rebuttal witness not
listed on their pretrial witness list. °2 In a short and not well set out analysis,
the Seventh Circuit conflated Rules 16, 26(a), 37(c) and cited to Spray-Rite
for the list of factor that should be considered in excluding witness
testimony. 03 The problem is that the court applied these factors traditionally
used when there was a violation of a pre-trial order issued by a judge, to an
entirely new self-executing rule without any indication by the rules or any
analysis of the court. It may be that application of these factors to self-
executing disclosures makes as much sense as applying them to disclosures
ordered by a judge, but there should be some guidance in either the rules or
some reasoned explanation for doing so.
The adoption of the four-factor test into Rule 37(c) seems to be well
settled, however. In Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc.,"° the Third Circuit
agreed with the Seventh Circuit and adopted the four-factor test when
determining whether a trial judge abused his discretion in excluding witness
testimony.°'s In that case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for alleged
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act.'°6 In that case there was
9 For an example of the use of the substantial justification defense, see United States v.
$9,041,598.68 (5th Cir. 1998).
W 54 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1995).
too See, e.g., Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 71 (3d Cir. 1995).
101 The Plaintiffs alleged that the landlord violated their rights by refusing to allow them access
to a "hearing dog". See Bronk, 54 F.3d at 427.
102 See id. at 429.
103 See id. at 432.
104 60 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 1995).
15 See id. at 156 (citing Bronk, 54 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1995), as interpreting Rule 37(c)(1)). The
court stated, "[i]n ruling on motion to call witness not previously identified, 'district court should
consider prejudice or surprise to opposing party, ability of party to cure prejudice, likelihood ofdisruption,
and moving party's bad faith or willingness to comply'." Id.
106 The Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated because it was medically necessary to combine his
break time with lunch time against hospital policy. See id. at 154.
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some question as to whether the defendant's had complied with the self-
executing disclosures required under Rule 26(a). The plaintiff contended
that he never received the witness list and therefore the trial court erred in
allowing those witnesses to testify.' 7 The district court, having heard oral
argument on plaintiff's motion to exclude the witnesses, concluded that the
plaintiff "received either the list itself, or the cover letter attaching the list.""~
The court went on to explain that even if the plaintiff did not receive the list,
it did receive the cover letter and that should have put the plaintiff on notice
that an attachment was missing,' °9 and the plaintiff "should have sought the
list if he had not received it."'1 After reviewing the four-factor test for
exclusion of witnesses, the circuit court determine there was no abuse of
discretion by the trial judge in allowing the testimony where "there was no
reason to believe that Parkview acted in bad faith; and the court found that
Newman [plaintiff) knew the names of its witnesses and the scope of their
relevant knowledge well before trial.""' The problem with the court's ruling
is that it reverts back to pre-rule 26(a). It has the effect of shifting the burden
back to the party seeking the information. As the court stated "he [plaintiff]
should have sought the list if he had not received it."' Therefore, the court's
entire analysis of the four-factor test was skewed from the beginning.
The next two cases also apply the four-factor test, and reach nearly the
same general understanding as the Florida state courts. Generally, if the
witness' testimony is known there is no prejudice to the objecting party,
regardless of whether or not they are listed on the witness list.
In Licciardi v. TIG Insurance Group,' 3 the First Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that an expert witness' testimony should have been excluded
where it was directly contradictory to and beyond the expert's report."4 In
that case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries sustained on an
amusement park ride. Defendant requested that plaintiffsubmit to a medical
examination by its expert witness, and the court agreed.1 ' Accordingly, after
the medical examination, the defendant's expert produced a report which
stated that in his opinion, the plaintiff had suffered a "trauma from the
accident, but that this trauma was not the cause of the fibromyalgia [the
197 See id. at 155.
108 See id.
209 See id.
310 Id. at 156.
III Id.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
10 140 F.3d 357 (1st Cir. 1998).
114 See id. at 363.
its See id. at 360.
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injury complained of]." 116 Therefore, the plaintiff's case at trial focused on
proximate causation, not whether a trauma occurred in the first place.
However, at trial, the Defendant's expert changed his opinion, stating the
plaintiff did not suffer the trauma from the accident that she claimed.1 '7 The
plaintiff objected to this new testimony, but the trial court allowed it. 8 On
appeal, the circuit court reversed, stating that it was highly prejudicial to
allow the defendant's expert to change his testimony." 9 In effect, the
"Plaintiffwas prejudiced by presenting a case addressed to one key issue, only
to have defendant put on a case addressed to a different predicate key
issue.r'20 The circuit court also determine that the defendant's actions were
deliberate and in bad-faith.' 2' Evidence of this was the fact that four months
after defendant's expert examined the plaintiff and issued his report, he
visited the amusement park and inspected the ride.1" Nearly a year after that,
two days after the jury had been impaneled, the defendant supplemented his
answers to plaintiff's interrogatories statingthat the subject matter, substance,
and scope of the expert's opinion was stated in his report.' As evidenced by
this behavior, it would be impossible to find that the defendant's had
inadvertently failed to disclose the changed testimony.
In Burlington Insurance Co. v. Shipp,124 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held the trial court judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the
defendant's motion to amend its trial witness list six days prior to trial.12s In
that case, the issue before the court was whether a bar owner could
reasonably rely on an expectation of coverage of insurance based upon
statements made to her by an insurance salesman.'26 The defendant
insurance company failed to list the salesman on their pre-trial witness list,
claiming that at the time the joint pre-trial order was submitted, the company
believed the salesman to be incompetent. 2 The court rejected this
substantial justification argument stating that they could have listed him on
the pre-trial order and then simply not called him if he was later determined
116 See id.
" See id.
ls See id. at 361.
119 See id. at 363.
12D See id.
12, See id. at 367.
122 See id. at 361.
123 See id.
124 No. 98-2722, 2000 WL 620307 (4th Cir. May 15, 2000) (per curiam).
125 See id. at *2.
126 See id. at *1.
127 See id. at *5. The salesman had suffered a stroke. See id. at *1.
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incompetent. 128 The court went on to discuss the factors that tended to show
prejudice to the plaintiff if the trial court had allowed the defendant's to
amend their witness list at that late date. The trial court had cited concerns
about disruption to the trial as well as the plaintiff's pre-trial preparation,
while "yielding testimony that would be marginally useful to the fact
finder."'"
V. CONCLUSION
The present test for exclusion of a "surprise witness" under Florida rules
is the same test employed by the Federal courts under Rules 26(a) and 37(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The question then becomes that if the
test is the same in the end, does it make any sense for Florida to adopt a
similar provision?
The Florida courts mainly deal with surprise witnesses in the area of
expert witness disclosure. Therefore, since the self-executing disclosure
requirements are for fact witnesses only, adoption of Rule 26(a)(1) would not
substantially improve the surprise witness problem in Florida. Indeed judges
seem much more willing to exclude fact witness over expert witness because
an expert witness is central to the trial.
However, judges have expressed some dissatisfaction with the current
disclosure system in Florida. Many would like to see, in particular, that there
be a continuing duty to disclose updated information. Currently, the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure contains no such obligation.' 30 There is, however,
such a duty in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 26(e)(1) states:
A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals its
disclosures under subdivision (a) .... With respect to testimony of
an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision
(a)(2)(B) the duty extends both to the information contained in the
report and to information provided through a deposition of the
expert ....131
Therefore, the adoption of all of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, would help to eliminate the problem of surprise witness disclosure.
128 See id. at *5.
129 See id.
30 See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(e) ("A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a
response that was complete when made is under no duty to supplement the response to include
information thereafter acquired.").
131 FED. R. CIv. P. 26(e).
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Not only would there be a mandatory duty to disclose, but there would also
be an additional duty to supplement those disclosures.
The test for exclusion of a surprise witness cannot be the focal point in
the fight against "trial by ambush" as the Binger court believes. 32 Rather, the
focus must be more on the willingness of the parties to participate in liberal
permissive discovery, to eliminate surprise, and to produce a speedy and
efficient trial. 33 The question that is left unanswered is whether attorneys
will be more willing to participate when they have no choice. That is the
only way that the new rule is going to be more effective then when it was
discretionary, assuming that the courts are going to keep the same test for
exclusion. Studies are indicating that this will be the case.134 If this is true,
the beneficial effects of the rule can be felt in Florida if the state decides to
adopt all of Federal Rule 26, including the new mandatory disclosure rule.
32 See Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981); see aLso discussion infa
Parts I A-B.
13 See Green, supra note 1, at 279.
0 See Churchill & Manickam, supra note 12.
